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Following the principles of Cognitive Grammar, we concentrate on a 
model for reference resolution that attempts to overcome the 
difficulties of previous approaches, based on the fundamental 
assumption that all reference (independent on the type of the referring 
expression) is accomplished via access to and restructuring of domains 
of reference rather than by direct linkage to the entities themselves. 
The model accounts for entities not explicitly mentioned but 
understood in a discourse, and enables exploitation of discursive and 
perceptual context to limit the set of potential referents for a given 
referring expression. As the most important feature, we note that our 
model can with a single mechanism handle what are typically treated 
as diverse phenomena. Our approach, then, provides a fresh 
perspective on the relations between Cognitive Grammar and the 
problem of reference. 
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1. Introduction 
The work presented in this paper can be situated within a wider attempt to 
define man-machine dialogue systems that respects the fundamental 
communication means of their users. In particular, even when the 
underlying task to be achieved through such dialogue systems is limited 
(e.g. instructional dialogues or information querying), we make the 
assumption that the intrinsic richness of language may be observed and thus 
has to be taken into account in those systems. As a consequence, possible 
models for such phenomena should be both computationally valid, since 
they have to be implemented and integrated within real systems, but also, 
and foremost, linguistically sound, as they should provide a coverage as 
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good as possible of the variety of cases that real observation may confront us 
with. In this paper, we will attempt to show how this objective can be 
realised in the domain of reference resolution, which is a crucial factor of 
success for a dialogue system with regards its user’s acceptance as a good 
intermediate to achieve their task. More specifically, we try to see to what 
extent formalising a cognitive model, namely Langacker’s Cognitive 
Grammar (1987, 1991) , is a way to maintain both linguistical soundness and 
coverage, but also computational validity. 
It’s a fact that the complexity of reference resolution is due, in part, to the 
variety of referring expressions, including pronominal reference, definite 
description, demonstratives, etc. The problem is made even more complex 
by the apparent variety of mechanisms required to deal with just one of 
these types of referring expression. For example, the referent of a definite 
description may be linked to a prior entity within the discourse, “bridged” 
to a prior entity from which it can be inferred, or accommodated in the 
discourse domain (Bos et al. 1995; Vieira and Poesio 2000).  
Moreover, much work on reference centres on pronominal reference (Kamp 
and Reyle 1993; Lappin and Laess 1994; Grosz et al. 1995; Mitkov 1998). As a 
result, the treatment of other types of referring expressions is typically seen 
as an extension of or variation on the basic co-referential mechanism 
involved in pronominal reference. Such an approach, however, does not 
predict essential differences between the use of pronouns, definite 
descriptions and demonstratives in contexts where human users would have 
clear preferences. 
Yet, our aim is to design a model of reference resolution to be implemented 
in human machine dialogue systems. Since it has been shown by 
psycholinguistic studies (Vivier et al. 1997) that it is very difficult and 
unnatural to impose restrictions on the spontaneous use of referring 
expressions, we need a unified model of reference, e.g. a model which 
handles with a single mechanism different types of referring expressions: 
definite descriptions, demonstratives and pronouns. 
One of the backbones of a model for reference resolution is the context 
model. It is intended to save relevant contextual information for the 
attribution of referents to referring expressions. Several context models for 
reference interpretation have already been proposed. Among the best 
known, Grosz and Sidner (1986) explore the relation between intentional 
discourse structure and limits of the referential space, modelled as a stack of 
focus spaces. Centering Theory (Grosz et al. 1995) proposes mechanisms for 
pronominal reference resolution between adjacent discourse units, based on 
a partially ordered list of entities introduced within them. Discourse 
Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993) constructs a global context, 
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comprising all potential referents introduced in the discourse, for which 
accessibility constraints are defined based on syntactic criteria. 
A first problem of these approaches is that linking is considered as the basic 
operation for referent attribution. As a result, additional mechanisms have to 
be introduced for other types of relations, such as bridging or 
accommodation (Lascarides and Asher 1993; Bos et al. 1995). However, the 
systematic preference for linking seems to be questionable not only from a 
linguistic point of view (Corblin 1987), but also from an empirical one: as 
shown by Poesio and Vieira (1998), it does not correctly reflect the use of 
definite descriptions in corpora. Following the authors, about 50% of definite 
descriptions in a newspaper corpus are used to introduce a new entity in the 
discourse, and 18% are used as bridging. This means that about 70% of 
definite descriptions are not actually “linked” to a prior discourse entity. 
Additionally, we observed through the referential annotation of task-
oriented dialogue corpora that it often seems counter-intuitive to link a 
definite description to a discursive antecedent even mentioned far ahead, 
when the referent is directly accessible in the visual environment (Salmon-
Alt, 2001c). Finally, the linking principle is not entirely suitable for the 
referential treatment of one-anaphora (the red one), other-expressions (the 
other triangle) and ordinals (the first triangle). These expressions seem to 
suppose, rather than a directly accessible entity to which they can be linked, 
a locally activated context set from which the referent can be extracted. 
A second problem concerns the internal structure of the context model. The 
basic entities of the context models that we have introduced are previously 
mentioned discourse referents. This seems to be insufficient, because 
reference resolution relies not only on discursive information, but equally on 
conceptual knowledge and visual information (Cremers 1996). Furthermore, 
whereas DRT provides access to all previously mentioned entities, CT 
considers the previous discourse unit only. However, within the list of 
identified potential referents, CT provides a precise account of relative 
salience, whereas DRT specifies only syntactic constraints to narrow the list. 
Some recent models attempt to apply more precise selection criteria to global 
discourse (Asher 1993; Hahn and Strube 1997). But they rely on some prior 
discourse analysis, a strategy that presupposes the ability to automatically 
recognise discourse structure, and implicitly assumes that discourse analysis 
precedes reference resolution.  
A third problem with these approaches is the context updating operation. 
We believe that context updating intended to reflect at least some cognitive 
mechanisms should consist of more than just introducing and linking 
entities. More precisely, we consider that referring is not only identifying a 
referent, but also, imposing a particular point of view on the referent and the 
manner it has been isolated within a set of potential referents. The idea that 
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“a word or an utterance, since it not only specifies the perceived referent but 
also the set of excluded alternatives, contains more information that the 
simple perception of the event itself” has already been defended by Olson 
(1970:265). We assume that this feature should be used to enhance the 
predictive power of a model of reference calculus. See for instance 
example (1):  
(1) The green block supports the big pyramid but not the red one. (Winograd 
1972) 
Without taking into account the fact of having identified the first block 
based on its colour, it is indeed impossible to resolve correctly the reference 
for the elliptic expression the red one in example (1). In particular, a heuristic 
strategy consisting in choosing the nominal head of the most recent noun 
phrase as an “antecedent” would fail here. 
To summarise, the following propositions are prerequisites for any model 
that attempts to overcome these three problematic points:  
– It should take into account all the linguistic variety of referring 
expressions. 
– It should consider that the basic mechanism common to all types of 
reference is not linking. Rather, it is an extraction from locally activated 
sets of referents, which are created based on discursive, perceptual and 
conceptual information.  
– It should propose a mechanism of context restructuring which overcomes 
the standard operations of introducing and linking referents by keeping 
information about activated context sets and differentiation criteria 
actually used. 
The next section shows how these properties are related to the theoretical 
foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Section 3 presents the basic principles 
underlying a cognitive, rather than linguistic model of reference. Section 4 
applies the principles to an example. 
2. Basics of Cognitive Grammar 
2.1 Some theoretical foundations 
Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1986, 1991) situates linguistic competence 
within a more general framework of cognitive faculties by assuming that 
language is neither self-contained, nor describable without reference to 
cognitive processing. A speaker’s linguistic knowledge is characterised as a 
structured inventory of conventional units: phonological units combine with 
semantic units to form symbolic units, which may be of any size, from a 
morpheme to a sequence of sentences (van Hoek 1995). 
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A first fundamental assumption of Cognitive Grammar is that syntax is 
not an independent component of linguistic analysis. Basic grammatical 
categories as well as complex syntactic rules are represented by maximally 
schematic symbolic units - acquired and adjusted through exposure to 
actually occurring structures - which are used in constructing and 
evaluating new expressions. As a second basic assumption, sense is not 
represented by logical forms. The first reason for this is that semantic 
structures are characterised relative to knowledge systems that are 
essentially open-ended. Secondly, the meaning of a given expression cannot 
be reduced to an objective characterisation of the situation described: 
equally important for semantics is how the speaker chooses to construe the 
situation. Therefore, Cognitive Grammar assumes a conceptual rather than 
truth-conditional semantics, considering that meaning consists of a process 
of conceptualisation, i.e. activation and restructuring of conceptions in a 
hearers mind.  
More precisely, the conceptualisation of an expression is said to impose a 
particular image on its domain. A domain is defined as a cognitive structure 
that is presupposed by the semantic pole of an expression. The particular 
image imposed by the expression emerges through the profiling of a 
substructure of the domain, namely that substructure which the expression 
designates. The profiled subpart of a domain is hypothesised to be more 
prominent or more highly activated than the domain. However, the 
semantic value of an expression neither resides in the profile, nor in the 
domain, but rather in a relationship between the two. 
As an example, the semantics of the expression roof presupposes the 
conception of HOUSE and profiles a specific subpart of it (Figure 1a). The 
expressions parent profiles a more abstract conception, being characterised 
with respect to the conception of a KINSHIP NETWORK (Figure 1b) It is 
important to note first that any cognitive structure can function as a domain 
- a concept, a conceptual complex, a perceptual experience, an elaborated 
knowledge system etc. Secondly, most expressions require more than one 
domain for their full description. The expression knife for example, is 
characterised, among others, by its shape specification (Figure 1c), its 
canonical rule in the process of cutting (Figure 1d), its inclusion in a typical 
place setting with other pieces of cutlery (Figure 1e). 
 
         (a)      (b)               (c )         (d)   (e )
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Figure 1 – Profiling domains (Langacker 1991) 
 
 
2.2 Suitability for our purpose 
Given our purpose – developing a model of reference resolution suitable for 
dialogue systems – the biggest problem with Cognitive Grammar is the lack 
of formalisation. It has, however, several nice properties with regard to the 
requirements we defined for a cognitive model of interpreting referring 
expressions (see the end of section 1). We focus here on these properties, 
before presenting in the next section (3) a model that integrates them into a 
framework sufficiently formal to have been implemented into a real 
dialogue system. 
The basic assumption about the meaning of linguistic expressions - profiling 
a substructure within a domain - leads to an explanation of the difficulties 
induced by considering linking as the basic referential operation. As we 
suggested before, the fundamental mechanism for interpreting referring 
expressions seems not to be a linking operation, but rather an extraction 
from a presupposed domain.  
If one accepts this point of view, bridging as well as one-anaphora integrate 
the picture without problems. Indeed, the referent of the roof in example (2) 
is extracted from the conceptual domain introduced by the house. In (3), the 
referent of the red one is extracted from a domain of coloured blocks, the 
same domain from which the referent of the green block has been extracted 
before. Additionally, linking is not excluded definitely, since it can be seen 
as a particular instantiation of an extraction operation. For example, the block 
in (4) is not considered as directly linked to the block mentioned before, but 
as extracted from a set introduced by the block and the pyramid.  
(2) The house is nice, but the roof has to be renovated. 
(3) The green block supports the big pyramid but not the red one. 
Moreover, this manner of considering reference basically as an extraction 
and not as a linking operation leads to an explanation of the differences 
between (4) and (5): whereas (4) sounds fine, the repetition of the block in (5) 
seems to be sub-optimal, compared to the use of the pronoun it like in (6). 
The explanation for this observation is the lack, in (5), of a suitable domain 
from which the referent could be extracted. In this case, the use of a pronoun 
is preferred. Whereas this phenomenon has been repeatedly noted in 
linguistic work (Corblin 1987; Gaiffe et al. 1997), current implementations do 
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not account for these observations. Furthermore, an explanation based 
exclusively on “cognitive statuses” of the referents (Ariel 1990; Gundel et al. 
1993) is insufficient: it is not evident where the difference between the 
cognitive statuses of the block introduced in the first utterances of (4) and (5) 
is. Consequently, the difference between the uses of a definite description in 
(4) and (5) cannot be predicted correctly. 
 (4) The block supports the pyramid. The block is big. 
(5) The block supports nothing. The block is big. 
(6) The block supports nothing. It is big. 
Besides the assumption that linguistic meaning is profiling a sub-structure 
within a given domain, a second interesting aspect of Cognitive Grammar is 
the fact that these cognitive domains are not essentially linguistic constructs. 
Rather, they are based on different knowledge systems, including 
encyclopaedic and visual information. This property is particularly helpful 
for dealing not only with bridging references like in the previous example 
(2), but also with reference to perceptual entities such as in (7), where the 
referent of the red block has not been mentioned before, but is accessible 
within the visual environment (Cremers 1996). Considering that cognitive 
domains are built from different knowledge systems allows then to integrate 
different uses of descriptions (anaphoric, associative, situational – see the 
classification of Hawkins (1978) into a unified model of reference. 
(7) Take the red block ! 
Third, a fundamental claim of cognitive semantics is that the interpretation 
of an expression is not only the description of a given situation. An equally 
important fact is construal, e.g. the way that facets of the conceived situation 
are portrayed. This claim corresponds closely to the one made by Olson 
(1970:265): “An appropriated utterance indicates which cues or features are 
critical, while a picture does not. Therefore, there is more information in an 
utterance than in the perception of an event out of context.” Applied to the 
interpretation of referring expressions, this means that the task is not 
completely done with the identification of the referent. Rather, it 
encompasses the identification of a local reference domain and updating the 
structure of this domain, by profiling the entity designated by the 
expression. As a result, not only the referent is identified and profiled as the 
most prominent element of its domain, but also the entire domain is 
activated, and therefore more accessible for the identification of further 
referents. 
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3. From Cognitive Grammar to a model of reference 
resolution  
3.1 Overview 
Following the principles of Cognitive Grammar, we concentrate on a model 
for reference resolution that attempts to overcome the difficulties discussed 
in the introduction. The model is based on the fundamental assumption that 
all reference (independent on the type of the referring expression) is 
accomplished via access to and restructuring of domains of reference rather 
than by direct linkage to the entities themselves. 
As shown in the previous section (2.2), Cognitive Grammar underlines the 
need of local context structures. Indeed, an expression is said to be 
interpreted within a limited domain, presupposed by its semantics, rather 
than within a global context model containing the list of all previous 
discourse referents. Therefore, the context representation has to furnish such 
domains. The next section (3.2) presents a context model built up on 
domains of reference, which are identifying representations for (possibly 
partitioned) subsets of contextual entities.  We will show in particular that 
these domains are not primarily linguistic constructs, since they are 
introduced and updated via discourse, perception or conceptual knowledge.  
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Figure 2 – Overview of the model for processing a referring expression 
“D N” 
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Based on a context modelled by domains of reference, we describe in section 
3.3 the interpretation process for referring expressions. We adopt here the 
hypotheses of Cognitive Grammar about the representation of meaning in 
terms of abstract symbolic schemas: more precisely, we assume that the 
semantics of a given expression can be represented by a schema which 
corresponds to an underspecified domain of reference. The underspecified 
domain itself is calculated by elaborating abstract schemas for nouns and 
determiners – presupposed in Cognitive Grammar – depending on the 
semantics of the constituents of the expression being interpreted. The 
interpretation process properly speaking consists of a unification of the 
underspecified domain with a suitable domain of reference from the context 
model and the profiling of a sub-structure – the referent – of this domain 
(Figure 2). 
3.2 The context model 
3.2.1 Basic units 
The basic units of our context model are reference domains. Following 
Sanford and Garrod (1982), Johnson-Laird (1987), Langacker (1991) and 
Reboul et al. (1997), we consider that reference domains are mental 
representations for entities to which it is possible to refer, including 
individual objects, collections of objects, events or states. The main 
difference between a mental representation of an entity and a representation 
of the entity itself is that a mental representation is not supposed to 
characterise entirely the entity. This reflects the fact that an expression 
introducing a new referent does not exhaust the potential features of this 
referent. Rather, it presents the entity from one or several particular points 
of view for which we assume in the following that it is the most likely to be 
activated for referential access to the entity. 
Basically, a reference domain is created each time a new entity is introduced 
in the discourse, but it may also be created for newly perceived entities. The 
representation of a reference domain consists of attribute-value pairs, 
minimally including a unique identifier and a type. Type information is 
derived from a set of generic domains, organised as a type hierarchy, which 
include general encyclopaedic knowledge or knowledge specific to the 
application and is assumed to exist prior to discourse processing. Other 
information provided via the discourse (e.g., specific properties of the object) 
and via perception (e.g., shape, colour, etc. for objects viewed on a screen) 
may be added as necessary.  
The most important feature of a reference domain are zero, one or more 
partitions. A partition gives information about possible decompositions of 
the domain. It could be based on previous discourse information, perceptual 
information or conceptual knowledge inherited from the generic domains. 
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The elements of a partition are pointers to other representations, which 
represent explicitly identified sub-components of the domain. They must be 
distinguishable from all the other sub-components by the value of a 
differentiation criterion, which represents a particular point of view on the 
domain and therefore predicts a particular referential access to its elements. 
For example, a domain of two marbles (@M, Figure 3) may contain partitions 
on the basis of colour (a red one and a blue one), position (the one on the 
right and the one on the left), etc.  
 
 
Type : MARBLE 
 
Properties : {blue} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
@m1 
Type : MARBLE 
 
Card = 2 
 
Partition p1 
CD : color 
blue red 
@m1 @m2 
  
 
Partition p2 
CD : position 
left right 
@m1 @m2 
 
@M 
Figure 3 – Reference domain for one blue marble (@m1) and for a 
group of two marbles (@M) 
Within a partition, at most one element may be profiled, according to 
perceptual or discursive prominence. Profiling is the result of specific 
operations on the domains, i.e. grouping and extraction. Grouping is briefly 
discussed below, and extraction, as a part of referential interpretation, is 
presented in the next section. 
3.2.2 The grouping operation 
The grouping operation is intended to structure the entities of the context 
model by grouping existing domains into more complex ones. The main 
goal of this operation is to create new domains and to make them available 
for the interpretation of referring expressions in the continuation of the 
discourse. The grouping operation can be triggered by discursive and 
perceptual factors. 
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Grouping on discursive factors is defined parallel to the assembly (or 
elaboration) of complex expressions: in Cognitive Grammar, complex 
symbols are created by integrating elements at both the semantic and 
phonological poles. Let us focus on the semantic composition of an example 
– the line on the left of the circle. Figure 4a shows the abstract schema or 
prototypical meaning of the preposition on the left of. It profiles a relationship 
between two things arranged in a horizontally oriented space. In Cognitive 
Grammar, relational predications involve an additional prominence 
asymmetry: the most prominent entity is termed the trajector (tr), and a less 
prominent one the landmark (lm). 
In our example, the abstract schema for on the left of is successively 
elaborated by the representations for the circle and the line, leading to a 
composite conception, with the line as the landmark, and therefore the most 
prominent element (Figure 4b).  
Parallel to Cognitive Grammar, the grouping operation of our model 
maintains the main characteristics of this assembly: it takes two or more 
domains as the arguments and returns a complex domain with a partition 
for the grouped elements. Figure 5a diagrams the grouping operation for the 
same example. Triggered by a discursive factor – here the preposition – the 
representations for the line (@L) and the circle (@C) are grouped into a 
complex domain, partitioned by two properties of the elements: their type 
and their position. The prominent element of the partition – the 
representation for the line – is the focused element of the domain (indicated 
by grey background). 
Additionally to discursive triggers (preposition, co-ordination, enumeration, 
arguments of the same predicate), grouping may be triggered by perceptual 
factors. We consider for instance that perceptual criteria such as similarity or 
proximity lead to the grouping of contextual entities. Algorithms for 
grouping visual entities following the principles of the Gestalt-Theory 
(Wertheimer 1923) can for example be found in Thorisson (1994). 
Depending on the type of the grouping trigger, at most one element of a 
complex domain may be prominent. The treated example – grouping 
triggered by the preposition on the left of – gives indeed raise to a domain 
containing a focused entity (Figure 5a). However, grouping does not 
automatically lead to a focused domain: if the operation is triggered by co-
ordination, the resulting domain does not contain any prominent entity 
(Figure 5b). 
To sum up, the context model contains domains of reference, which 
represent referents or sets of referents. A domain is characterised at least by 
type information and partitions, providing access to other domains. 
Partitions are either inherited from generic representations (for example the 
partition of an entity HOUSE into a ROOF, WINDOWS etc.), or the result of a 
Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-.. 
grouping operation, triggered by discourse or perceptual information. The 
three fundamental structural characteristics of domains – important to keep 
in mind for the interpretation process – are the following:  
– domain without any partition (@m1, Figure 3) ;  
– domain with a partition, but without any prominent item (Figure 5b); 
– domain with a partition containing a prominent item (Figure 5a). 
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   CIRCLE 
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Figure 4 – Assembly of complex expressions in Cognitive Grammar: 
“the line on the left of the circle” 
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(a) 
 « the line on the left of the circle» 
Figure 5 – Grouping operation, triggered by a preposition (a) and by a 
co-ordination (b) 
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3.3 Interpretation of referring expressions 
The context model presented in the previous section provides domains with 
one of the three fundamental structures mentioned before. Given this 
context representation, we consider that the role of a referring expression is 
to select one (or more, in case of ambiguity) of these domains and to 
restructure it by profiling the referent. The selection operation is constrained 
by the requirement of compatibility between the selected contextual domain 
and the underspecified domain construed for the expression being 
interpreted. In the following sections, we successively present: 
– the principles for calculating the underspecified domain depending on 
the semantics of a given expression (section 3.3.1); 
– the selection and unification procedure (section 3.3.2); 
– the restructuring operation, leading to the identification of the referent 
and to an updated and activated domain of reference (section 3.3.3).  
The three steps can be considered as going – from left to right – through the 
diagram of Figure 2. 
3.3.1 Calculus of the underspecified domain of reference 
The underspecified domain associated with a referring expression being 
interpreted is calculated on the basis of its semantics and depends on two 
criteria:  
– the abstract semantic schema for determiners, elaborated by the 
semantics of the current determiner; 
– the abstract semantic schema for nouns (Figure 6), elaborated by the 
semantics of the components of the current expression. 
The semantics of the determiner associated to the noun then combines with 
the schema for the noun in order to elaborate a composite representation.  
 
 
  
 
 
   
         (a)        (b) 
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Figure 6 – Abstract schema four a noun in Cognitive Grammar (a) 
expressed by a partitioned domain (b) 
In Cognitive Grammar, determiners are referred to as “grounding 
predications”. They specify the status of nominals in relation to the 
“ground”, comprising the speech event and its participants. Grounding 
pertains to questions of identification: whether or to what degree the speech-
act participants can locate the thing referred to within the mass of objects 
populating their conceptual universe (Langacker 1991:122 ff. and chapter 
12). We adapt this point of view by considering that determiners – precisely 
because of their power to “locate the thing referred to within the mass of 
objects populating the conceptual universe” – inform about the composition 
of the conceptual universe, corresponding in our model to the domain of 
reference. In this perspective, the determiner, in collaboration with the noun, 
gives information about the nature and/or properties of the other elements 
of the partition, i.e. the manner by which the referent (the designated region) 
is to be isolated within the domain.  
Based on these fundamental assumptions, our model accounts for a 
differentiated treatment of various types of referring expressions within a 
unified framework, following linguistic principles presented in particular in 
Corblin (1987) and Kleiber (1994). The next sections comment on Figure 7, 
showing how the semantics of indefinite, definite, demonstrative and 
pronominal expressions can be represented by different underspecified 
domains, which all elaborate the more abstract schema for a noun 
(Figure 6b). 
Indefinite expressions 
The standard analysis of indefinites (e.g. Russell, or more recently the DRT 
framework) views them as introducing a new discourse referent, which is 
independent from both the textual and extra-textual context. In our model, 
indefinites of the form “a N” (a circle) are considered as extracting an 
element from a domain containing elements of type N. Therefore, they 
presuppose at the very least such a domain. This can be a specific domain, 
i.e. a set of Ns given by the context, or per default, the generic (conceptual) 
domain of N.  
However, the idea of context independence is maintained by the fact that 
they select as their referent arbitrarily an element of the domain. It means 
that there are no constraints on existing partitions or profiled elements. The 
dotted structure for “a N” in Figure 7 should be considered as a virtual 
partition rather than as an existing one, since there is no differentiation 
criterion, distinguishing the elements N of this partition. It is just intended to 
indicate that the domain of Ns (specified by the “Type” attribute) must 
contain at least one element.  
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To sum up, the underspecified domain of reference for an indefinite noun 
phrase elaborates the abstract schema for nouns only by adding a type 
constraint (Type = N). In terms of referential interpretation, this means that 
an indefinite, in order to be interpreted, presupposes a contextual set (or, per 
default the generic class) of type compatible elements. 
 
[Type = N-
compatible] 
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Type = supertype(N) 
CD = type 
 
N ¬ N ¬ N 
  « the N »
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abstract schema for a noun 
Figure 7 – Building underspecified domains by elaborating the abstract 
schema for nouns 
Definite expressions 
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Current analyses of definite descriptions such as “the N”(cf. for example 
Bosch and Geurts 1990) assume them to presuppose the existence and 
unicity of their referent within a discourse model. Our model reflects these 
intuitions, yet by integrating them into a unified model of reference. Like 
indefinites and based on the abstract schema for nouns, a definite noun 
phrase presupposes a domain containing an element of type N. But 
additionally – in order to guarantee the unicity constraint – the complement 
of the partition must be distinguishable from that element.  
This means that “the N” builds an underspecified domain with, as the most 
important difference with indefinites,  a constraint on an existing partition: 
the intended referent must be uniquely identifiable via a differentiation 
criterion. In the case of noun phrases without modifiers, the differentiation 
criterion (CD) is assumed to be the type designated by “N”. As a 
consequence, the type of the elements of the domain must be a super-type of 
N, since it comprises elements of type N and of type ¬N.  
Pronominal expressions 
In agreement with most linguistic and computational work on 
understanding pronouns (for example Kleiber 1990; Grosz et al. 1995), we 
consider that a pronoun refers to an entity being already in the focus. In 
terms of our model, this means it designates a previous profiled region in 
some domain. A pronoun being semantically empty, the only constraint on a 
suitable domain of reference concerns the existence of at least one partition 
containing a focused entity. In particular, unlike indefinites and definite 
descriptions, a pronoun doesn’t convey any constraint on the type or the 
differentiation criterion of its domain.  
The structure of the underspecified domain is the one sketched in Figure 7: 
the only elaboration of the abstract schema for nouns consists in adding a 
focus constraint. This indicates that a pronoun needs a domain containing an 
already profiled element. Since this element has obligatorily been isolated in 
previous discourse or via perceptual clues by some differentiation criterion, 
the partition, unlike for indefinites, is not virtual. However, in comparison to 
definite descriptions, the nature of this criterion is not significant for the 
referential interpretation of the pronoun. 
Demonstrative expressions 
Our proposal for treating demonstratives is based on descriptive linguistics 
for French demonstratives (Corblin 1987; De Mulder 1998). In French, 
demonstratives seem to differ from demonstratives in other languages, in 
particular because of their reclassification power. Indeed, a demonstrative 
expression is said to be able to identify its referent independently of the 
semantic content of the noun: the semantic content of a demonstrative is 
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therefore available for a reclassification of the referent (Corblin 1987:209). 
For an example, see (11) onto which we will comment later. 
For our model, this means that the only suitable principle for the 
identification of the referent of demonstratives is focalisation. Unlike 
indefinites and definites, demonstratives do not convey any constraint on 
the type of the elements of the domain. Like pronouns, they refer to an entity 
being already profiled. Therefore, the appropriate domain must contain at 
least one partition, providing a profiled entity. (Figure 7). The only 
difference between pronouns and demonstratives is the restructuring 
operation discussed below (3.3.3). 
3.3.2 Selection procedure 
After the construction of an underspecified domain for the current 
expression being interpreted, this domain functions as a pattern for the 
selection of compatible domains from the contextual domains composing the 
discourse history (cf. 3.2). The selection procedure is modelled by two 
algorithms. The first one goes through the contextual domains, according to 
their activation level, starting with the most activated one. The second one is 
intended to test the compatibility between the underspecified domain and 
the current contextual domain. Compatibility depends on different criteria: 
type, cardinality, existing partitions, differentiation criteria and focalisation 
(Salmon-Alt 2001b). Once a compatible domain has been detected, it has to 
be unified with the underspecified domain. The resulting domain is 
returned as the domain of reference. From this domain, the referent will then 
be extracted by a restructuring operation, described in the next section 
(3.3.3). 
3.3.3 Restructuring the domain of reference 
Once a suitable domain has been identified among the domains available in 
the context model, the referent of the expression has to be extracted and 
profiled. This is done by a restructuring operation, depending on the type of 
the determiner. Additionally, the result of this operation is different for 
different s initial domain structures (resumed at the end of section 3.2.2).  
Figure 8 gives an overview about the possibilities of restructuring: the first 
column of the table displays possible structures for underspecified domains, 
depending on the determiner and introduced in section 3.3.1. The following 
three column s represent the result of the restructuring operation, each for a 
different initial structure of the context domain:  
– domain without partition; 
– domain with partition, but without prominent item; 
– domain with a partition containing a prominent item.  
Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-.. 
In the following, we discuss the restructuring operation more in detail, 
depending on the type of the expression to interpret. 
Indefinite expressions 
Indefinites are seen as creating systematically a new partition. Within this 
partition, the referent of the expression is extracted arbitrarily and opposed 
to the other elements of the domain by a differentiation criterion based on 
the predicate of the sentence. Furthermore, the extracted referent will be 
profiled.  
The main prediction captured via this operation is the context independence 
(non-anaphoric use) of indefinites. Indeed, an indefinite expression is 
compatible with all of the three possible context structures. Additionally, 
there is no link between the newly created and any existing partition. For 
example, a big horizontal line in A1 of example (8) is extracted from a domain 
of big horizontal lines where the restructuring operation leads to a partition 
based on the differentiation criterion “to take” vs. “not to take”. In the same 
way, we predict that a second expression of the same form – see A2’’ in (8) – 
could not be used to refer to the same object. The indefinite in A2’’ leads to 
the creation of a new partition within the domain of big horizontal lines, but 
since nothing requires to unify these two partitions, the referential identity 
of the two referents is not guaranteed.  
As an interesting point, we predict also that the unification of two partitions 
created by indefinites must be the linguistically marked case. This is indeed 
the case of A2’’’ in example (8). Here, the referential disjunction – and 
therefore a case of context dependence – for the indefinite another big 
horizontal line is indeed marked explicitly by the modifier another.  
(8)  A1  take a big horizontal line 
B1  yes 
A2  and put it on the top of the triangles 
A2’  and put the big horizontal line on the top of the triangles  
A2’’  and put a big horizontal line on the top of the triangles 
A2’’’ and put another big horizontal line on the top of the triangles 
Definite expressions 
For a definite expression the N, the item of the suitable type N is identified 
and profiled within the existing partition of the domain of reference. Note 
that a definite extracts preferentially a not yet profiled element, so that the 
Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-.. 
preferred restructuring operation for definites seems to be a profile 
modification.  
The interpretation of a definite description is fundamentally context 
dependant, since it needs a domain with an existing partition in order to 
isolate an item. This constraint explains why a definite description the circle 
cannot be used for referring to an element of a not yet partitioned domain, 
such as introduced discursively by two figures in A1, example (9): 
(9)    A1 take two figures 
 A2 and put the circle on the top of the triangle  
This example is however interpretable, via the presupposition of a suitable 
partitioned domain, introduced by visual perception. The expression the 
circle can then be seen as selecting the perceptual domain of the figures taken 
after A1. Within this domain of figures, a partition must distinguish the 
figures with regard to their type, so that the expression can isolate and 
profile the referent based on its type.  
We also predict the lower acceptability of A2’ in example (8), with regard to 
the pronoun in A2: here, the definite description is interpreted within the 
domain created in A1, opposing one big horizontal line (profiled) to the 
others. But since the definite description leads to profiling the already 
focused element, it does not play the role of a “profile modifier”. This 
correlates with the intuition of an “sub-optimal” use of the definite 
description, since a pronoun would have the same effect with less effort 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986). 
Pronominal expressions 
The restructuring operation for pronouns is empty: a pronoun does not 
change the structure or the profile of its domain.  
Pronouns are therefore seen as indicating the continuity of a domain 
structure. They need a pre-focused domain and do not change the focus and 
partition structure. Thus, the typical interpretation principle for pronouns 
(cf. for example Kleiber 1994; Grosz et al. 1995) – referring to objects that are 
in the focus – is maintained. A2 in example (8) illustrates that. Furthermore, 
our model does predict awkward cases, for instance A2 of example (10), 
where the pronominal reference is difficult to interpret, because of the lack 
of a profiled domain in the context given by A1’. 
(10)  A1’ take a big horizontal line and a small square 
 A2 and put it on the top of the triangles  
Demonstrative expressions 
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Demonstratives take the profiled referent of a given reference domain and 
change the point of view on this referent by inserting it into a new domain. 
This feature distinguishes them from pronouns which do not change the 
structure of the initial domain. 
In example (11), the interpretation of this figure needs a profiled domain such 
as introduced by a big horizontal line in A1. Within this domain, the 
expression identifies the profiled element and reclassifies it as an element of 
type FIGURE by inserting it into a new domain of figures.  
(11) A1 take a big horizontal line 
B1  yes 
A2 and put this figure on the top of the triangles 
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Figure 8 – Compatibility between contextual domains and different 
types of referring expressions 
Furthermore, we predict that demonstratives, like pronouns, are 
incompatible with non profiled domains. This case is shown in (12) where 
this figure can hardly be interpreted within the domain introduced by a big 
horizontal line and a small square. 
(12)  A1’ take a big horizontal line and a small square 
 A2 and put this figure on the top of the triangles  
4. An Example 
In order to illustrate the principles introduced in the previous section, we 
propose now to apply them to the interpretation of the referring expressions 
of an example, taken from a corpus of task oriented dialogues (Ozkan 1994): 
(13)  A1 alors tu vas prendre un gros rond 
 so you have to take a big circle 
 A2 voilà et à gauche de ce rond tu vas prendre une petite barre 
 okay, and on the left of this circle, you have to take a small line 
 A3 tu ne la colles pas au rond hein 
 don’t stick it on the circle 
We start with an empty context. The indefinite un gros rond (a big circle) leads 
to the construction of an underspecified domain such as in Figure 9a. Since 
no suitable domain is available from the context model, the expression is 
interpreted within the generic domain of BIG CIRCLES (@BC). It extracts its 
referent from this domain by creating a new partition, characterising 
uniquely the referent (@bc1) with regard to the other elements of the domain 
by a differentiation criterion based on predicative information (to take). The 
resulting context domain is the domain in (b). The underspecified domain 
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for the demonstrative ce rond (this circle) constraints only the existence of a 
partition with a profiled element (c). The domain available in the context 
(@BC) is compatible with this constraint: the profiled element (@bc1) is 
extracted as the referent and is inserted into a new domain of elements of 
type CIRCLE (d). The indefinite une petite barre (a small line) is interpreted in 
the same way as the first indefinite: it profiles an element (@sl1) within the 
generic domain SMALL LINE (f). At this point, a grouping operation 
intervenes, triggered by the preposition à gauche de (on the left of). The two 
contextual elements build up a complex domain of type FIGURE, 
distinguishing them by their type and position, and profiling the small line 
as the trajector (g). According to our principles, the underspecified domain 
for the pronoun la (it) imposes a constraint on the existence of a profiled 
element within the domain (h). @FG provides such a domain: the profiled 
referent is re-identified, and the domain structure maintained. Finally, the 
definite le rond (the circle) builds an underspecified domain such as (j). It 
constrains the type of the elements (super-type of CIRCLE: FIGURE) and the 
structure of the partition, which has to provide an element of type CIRCLE, 
preferentially not profiled. This domain is compatible with (i), from which 
@bc1 is extracted and profiled as a referent (k). 
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Figure 9 : Interpretation of example (13) 
5. Discussion 
By interpreting a referring expression through a restructuring operation 
within a domain, we capture the hypothesis of Cognitive Grammar that a 
referring expression is not only used to identify some entity in a context, but 
also to convey – through the choice of the determiner and lexical items – a 
particular point of view on the manner that entity is isolated within the 
domain. On the base of these principles, synthesised in Figure 8, we are able 
to make a certain number of predictions, corresponding to the use of 
referring expressions in natural language production. Moreover, this 
approach is consistent with linguistic work on referring expressions having 
shown that each type of referring expression has specific properties, with 
regard to the presupposed context structures as well as to the interpretative 
effects (Corblin 1987; Kleiber 1994). 
Our model was originally developed to handle reference in a corpus of 
dialogues concerning the manipulation of figures on a computer screen. 
Because of the need to deal with all types of reference and different kind of 
information (linguistic, perceptual and conceptual), our model focuses on 
cognitive representations and operations rather than primarily linguistic 
phenomena. However, applying the model to text as well demonstrated that 
some phenomena that have not been adequately handled in previous work 
on discourse are easily accommodated in our approach. As the most 
important feature, we note that our model can with a single mechanism 
handle what are typically treated as diverse phenomena. Our approach, 
then, provides at the very least a fresh perspective on the relations between 
Cognitive Grammar and the problem of reference that may contribute to the 
overall development of models for reference resolution. 
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